Pressures to increase public expenditure and patterns of procyclical expenditure by Abbott, Andrew & Jones, Philip
        
Citation for published version:
Abbott, A & Jones, P 2014, 'Pressures to increase public expenditure and patterns of procyclical expenditure',
Economic Issues, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 37-51.
Publication date:
2014
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Pressures to Increase Public Expenditure
and Patterns of Procyclical Expenditure
Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones1
ABSTRACT
This paper draws on the literature that explains why governments spend pro-
cyclically, to predict the pattern of cyclical expenditure across government budg-
ets. Procyclical expenditure increases at a faster rate than income in economic
upturns and falls at a faster rate in recessions. The more politicians indulge
pressures to increase expenditure in an economic upturn, the more they find it
difficult to sustain expenditure in a recession. In this paper, differences in politi-
cians' willingness to increase expenditure in an economic upturn are relevant
when predicting patterns of cyclical expenditure across budgets. Predictions are
tested with reference to expenditures from government budgets in 23 OECD
countries (over the period 1995-2006). Central government capital expenditure
and sub-central government expenditure are systematically more procyclical
than expenditures from other budgets. 
1. INTRODUCTION
ALESINA ET AL. (2008) note that economists often anticipate countercyclicalexpenditure (an increase in expenditure when output falls below poten-tial output) when there is increasing evidence of procyclical public
expenditure. While procyclical expenditure was first identified in Latin
America (Gavin et al., 1996), there is evidence of procyclical expenditure in
developing countries (e.g. Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Woo,
2009) and in the OECD (e.g. Arreaza et al., 1998; Hercowitz and Strawczynski,
2004; Lane, 2003; Abbott and Jones, 2011).
Studies have offered insight into the reasons why government expen-
ditures are procyclical. Some offer normative rationales. They identify the cir-
cumstances in which procyclical expenditures increase a community's welfare
(Lane, 2003; Alesina et al., 2008). Others offer a ‘positive’ approach. They
focus, for example, on the political pressures that governments face in eco-
nomic upturns. Politicians face intense pressures to increase expenditure and,
as a consequence, they find it impossible to sustain expenditure in an eco-
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nomic downturn. In this paper, the objective is to call on this ‘positive’
approach to predict the pattern of cyclical expenditures across government
budgets.
A common theme in this literature is the intensity of pressures to
increase expenditures in an economic upturn. The intensity of pressures to
increase expenditures from different budgets is relevant, but in this paper
politicians’ willingness to accommodate political pressures is also relevant.
Vote-maximising politicians are always wary that increases in expenditures
will alert the electorate to the possibility of an increase in taxation. In eco-
nomic upturns (when tax revenues are increasing) politicians are more likely
to increase expenditures from some government budgets than from others.
Pressures to increase public expenditures are often motivated by the
prospect of an economic rent (Tullock, 1967). An economic rent is a payment
in excess of the payment that would be received in a competitive market.
‘Small’ groups find it easier to organise and to lobby governments than ‘large’
groups (Olson, 1965). Small producer groups are often motivated by the eco-
nomic rents that they might secure if governments can be persuaded to
increase expenditures. However, in this paper the relative size of the group is
also important, because politicians are more likely to accommodate pressures
to increase government spending if they are exerted by relatively 'small'
groups. They are more willing to accommodate these pressures because they
are able to dissipate any increase in tax costs over a much larger group of tax-
payers (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).
Politicians are aware that they will win support when they increase
government expenditure and that they will lose support when they increase
taxation, but politicians are also myopic (Downs, 1957; Buchanan and Lee,
1982). They focus on a four, to five, year electoral cycle. When they face pres-
sure to increase expenditures in an economic upturn, they discount the diffi-
culties they might encounter if the economy moves into recession. The focus
of their concerns is the likelihood that they will alert the electorate to any
prospect of an increase in taxation. In this paper, the proposition is that they
are less likely to alert the electorate to any prospect of an increase in taxation
if (in economic upturns) they increase expenditures from some budgets, rather
than from others.
Empirical studies (e.g. Lane 2003) highlight the relevance of political
pressure in economic upturns to explain procyclical expenditure. If willing-
ness to accommodate pressure is relevant when focussing on total expendi-
ture, will differences in willingness to accommodate pressure be relevant when
focussing on the pattern of cyclical expenditures across government budgets?
Section two of the paper explains why pressures to increase govern-
ment expenditure are intense in an economic upturn. It draws on theoretical
insights in the literature to predict the pattern of cyclical expenditures from
different government budgets. Section three of the paper describes the data
and the models employed to test predictions. The paper tests predictions with
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reference to budgetary expenditures in the OECD. The empirical model is an
error-correction model designed to estimate short-run spending adjustments
alongside a long-run relationship between income and government spending.
This error-correction framework is particularly apposite because it acknowl-
edges Wagner’s Law. It acknowledges the long-run relationship between levels
of income and levels of spending (Wagner, 1911). A short-run error-correction
model (ECM) is estimated using the dynamic panel data estimator of Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Section four of the paper
presents the results and section five concludes.
2. THE RELEVANCE OF THE ‘DISTRIBUTION OF FISCAL POWER’
There are circumstances in which a beneficent government would choose pro-
cyclical expenditure to maximise a community's welfare. When markets are work-
ing perfectly and when public-sector goods and private-sector goods are comple-
ments, there is a rationale for procyclical government spending (Lane, 2003).
A first concern is that this rationale is unlikely to explain why govern-
ments rely on procyclical spending, because the circumstances in which it
applies are very specific. A second concern is that the empirical evidence sug-
gests that procyclical expenditures are produced as a consequence of prag-
matic responses to political pressures. When Halland and Bleaney (2009, p.4)
surveyed the literature that focuses on these pragmatic responses, they
reported that:  ‘…essentially three types of explanations have been suggested:
i) restrictions on access to domestic…and /or international credit markets…,
ii) institutions or political structures and iii) the polarization of preferences.’
The first type of explanation of procyclical expenditure focuses on the
difficulties governments experience if they must borrow to sustain expendi-
tures in a recession. Credit restrictions are particularly relevant when
focussing on developing countries’ failure to smooth business cycles (e.g. see
Gavin and Perotti, 1997).2
The second type of explanation of procyclical expenditures focuses on
the argument that competition between pressure groups (for more government
spending) increases as national income increases. Lane and Tornell (1996)
and Tornell and Lane (1999) argue that this produces ‘voracity effects’. The
importance of this increase in pressure in an economic upturn is that there is
no budget surplus sufficient to sustain expenditure in a recession. Talvi and
Végh (2005) also offer this insight. They refer to ‘…an increasing convex func-
tion of the size of the budget…’ as income increases (Halland and Bleaney,
2009, p. 5). Alesina et al. (2008) follow suit when they focus on pressures to
increase expenditures in an economic upturn. They argue that voters press
governments to spend because they fear that, otherwise, the increasing gov-
ernment revenues will be squandered on rents to government supporters.
The third type of explanation focuses on the polarisation of preferences
for increased government expenditure. Woo’s (2009) theoretical model predicts
Economic Issues, Vol. 19, Part 2, 2014
- 41 -
that the likelihood of procyclical expenditure will increase if the heterogeneity
of preferences of different groups in the community increases. Heterogeneity
increases as income inequality increases (measured with reference to the Gini
coefficient) and this variable was significant when Woo tested for fiscal pro-
cyclicality.
In this literature, the emphasis is on ‘demand’ for increased expendi-
ture but, in this paper, the emphasis is on politicians’ willingness to ‘supply’
increases in government expenditure. The literature that explains levels of
government expenditure indicates that levels of expenditure are higher than
anticipated when tax systems rely on high income-elasticities of tax revenue
(e.g. Oates, 1975; Craig and Heins, 1980). They are higher because politicians
are able to increase expenditures without alerting their electorate to any like-
lihood that there will be an increase in taxation. The same consideration is
implicit in the literature that focuses on procyclical government, e.g. Woo
(2009) recognises the relevance of willingness to accommodate pressures to
increase public expenditure. When he modelled the importance of social polar-
isation of preferences, he argued that different groups have a greater incentive
to press their case ‘…when rising government revenues or newly available
resources make their agenda seem more feasible…’ (p.851).
Lane (2003, p. 2665) suggests that ‘...it is plausible that variation in
procyclicality across different expenditure items will be influenced by the spe-
cific distribution of fiscal power...’ The distribution of fiscal power depends on
the way that pressures to increase government spending are exerted and on
the way that pressures are received. Both considerations are likely to be rele-
vant when predicting the pattern of cyclical expenditure across budgets.
In this paper, the intention is to predict cyclicality across: (1) budgets
(e.g. capital and current spending) at a specific fiscal tier and (2) budgets at
different government tiers (central or sub-central tiers of government).
2.1 Central government expenditures
Lane (2003, p.2665) argues that ‘...individual voters may care most about
public consumption goods or transfers, business interests about infrastruc-
ture; and government employees about public sector wages...’  The implication
is that (other things equal) producer groups are more likely (than consumer
groups) to press for increases in capital expenditures.
As noted above, the literature that compares the efficacy of lobby
groups argues that ‘small’ producer groups are at an advantage. In ‘large’
groups, the free-rider problem atrophies individuals' willingness to act collec-
tively (Olson, 1965; Buchanan, 1968). Becker (1983, 1985) argues that ‘small’
groups are more successful than ‘large’ groups when there is political compe-
tition. However, it is also the case that ‘small’ groups are at an advantage
because an increase in tax (incurred accommodating ‘small’ groups) can be
dissipated over a ‘large’ number of taxpayers (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).
Politicians are more likely to accommodate demands for increased capital
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expenditure because the electorate is not as aware of any increase in capital
expenditure. Downs (1960) demonstrates that voters are more aware of poli-
cies that exert a direct and tangible impact on their day-to-day life. If an
increase in spending should alert concern that taxation might also increase,
this will be more acute when increasing government consumption expendi-
ture. It is also the case that it is far more difficult to ‘rein in’ government con-
sumption if an economy's upturn should prove transitory. A finite ‘one off’
investment might imply future maintenance costs, but voters are not as con-
cerned because they are not as aware of the implied tax commitment.
If politicians are prepared to accommodate relatively ‘small’ groups
(because tax costs can be dissipated over a ‘large’ group of taxpayers), they are
systematically more likely to accommodate pressures to increase capital
expenditures (than consumption expenditures).
2.2 Sub-central government expenditures
If politicians are willing to accommodate pressure from relatively ‘small’
groups (because tax can be dissipated across a relatively ‘large’ group of tax-
payers), politicians in sub-central governments are more willing (than central-
government politicians) to increase expenditures in an economic upturn.
Vote-maximising politicians in sub-central governments have an
incentive to press for intergovernmental transfers because they are able to use
intergovernmental transfers to increase expenditures without introducing a
new tax, or a new tax rate. As Mueller (2003, p.223) notes, ‘...the more the gov-
ernment spends holding taxes constant the happier voters are and the higher
the probability of incumbent politicians being re-elected’. The comparison with
the position of ‘small’ producer groups is obvious. Sato (2007, p.183) notes
that sub-central governments: ‘…may also undertake rent-seeking or lobbying
activities in order to obtain more transfers… (and) …small lobbying groups (or
regions) may be more successful than larger ones, because the cost of trans-
fers to them is so widely spread so that it is not noticeable (Becker, 1983)…’
Receipt of intergovernmental transfers is likely to be procyclical. Abbott
and Jones (2013) argue that competition for intergovernmental transfers is
more effective when national income is increasing and central tax revenues
are increasing. When national income is falling, vote-maximising politicians at
central government are under pressure to increase 'direct' central government
expenditures (e.g. health, education, transport) to signal they are increasing
aggregate demand to stabilise the economy.3 Voters' evaluation of politicians
at central government depends on their perception of a politician's ability to
manage the economy (Jones and Hudson, 1996).
If intergovernmental transfers are procyclical and if local politicians are
willing to spend more from transfers (because they do not need to increase
taxation),  sub-central government expenditures gross of intergovernmental
transfers are likely to be more procyclical than sub-central government
expenditure net of intergovernmental transfers. There is a literature that
Economic Issues, Vol. 19, Part 2, 2014
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reports the existence of a ‘flypaper effect’ (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Bailey and
Connolly, 1998 survey this literature). Even when sub-central governments
receive transfers as lump sum grants, government spending increases by a
greater proportion from an increase in grant income than it would if there had
been an equal increase in tax revenue (raised from local taxpayers). There is a
‘flypaper effect’ because ‘money sticks where it hits’ — in the public sector. At
the heart of this literature is the argument that voters press for further expen-
diture because their perception is that the receipt of an intergovernmental
transfer reduces the marginal cost of public spending programmes (Oates,
1979). In sub-central governments politicians are able to spend more because
the largest share of the tax costs of any increase in expenditure will be borne
by taxpayers in other constituencies.
In a sub-central government, politicians are willing to spend more in
an economic upturn because intergovernmental transfers are procyclical and
because they are able to dissipate any increase in tax costs across the ‘large’
group of taxpayers within the nation state. The implication is that, in sub-cen-
tral governments, politicians (unable to rely, to any significant extent, on bor-
rowing4) will find it difficult to sustain expenditure in a recession. Abbott and
Jones (2013) present evidence that indicates intergovernmental transfers and
sub-central government expenditures are more procyclical the greater the
degree of decentralisation (i.e. the greater the number of ‘small’ sub-central
government jurisdictions).
In sub-central governments, politicians have less reason to fear vote-loss
than central-government politicians (because they are able to fund expenditures
from intergovernmental grants) and the implication is that differences in pro-
cyclicality between sub-central current expenditures and capital expenditures
are likely to be less obvious than differences in procyclicality between central
government current and capital expenditures. In these jurisdictions, politicians
are more likely to indulge pressures to increase capital and current spending in
economic upturns the more they feel that the costs are financed by transfers. As
a consequence, they are more likely to find it difficult to sustain expenditures
from both of these budgets when the economy moves into recession.
If politicians are more willing to accommodate pressures to increase gov-
ernment spending from relatively ‘small’ groups because they can dissipate the
tax costs over a relatively ‘large’ group of taxpayers, the predicted pattern of pro-
cyclical expenditures can be described as:
(i) higher values of procyclicality in central government capital expenditure
than in central government current expenditure;
(ii) higher values of procyclicality in sub-central government expenditure gross
of intergovernmental transfers than net of intergovernmental transfers;
(iii) a stronger procyclicality bias in central government capital expenditures-
relative to current expenditures than in sub-central government capital expen-
ditures-relative to current expenditures.
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3. MODEL AND DATA
To test for the procyclicality of government spending we use the following
autoregressive distributed lag error-correction model:5
for i=1,.....,N and t=1,......T.
where git is the log of real government expenditure for country i at time period
t and y is the log of real GDP. The error-correction specification allows the
simultaneous estimation of both the short-run adjustment process for git and
the long-run relationship between yit and git. δ estimates the cyclicality of gov-
ernment spending, with δ<0 indicating government spending is counter-cycli-
cal and δ>0 suggesting procyclical behaviour. The estimates of π1 and π2 iden-
tify the long-run relationship between the level of output and government
spending. A positive long-run relationship provides evidence in favour of
Wagner’s Law, with a strict interpretation consistent with a coefficient greater
than one in magnitude. αi are the individual effects that account for unob-
served cross-country heterogeneity, λt are common unobserved time effects,
and εit is a white noise error term.
Government expenditure data were obtained from the IMF’s
Government Finance Statistics database for the local, state and central tiers
of government, including total spending, current spending and expenditure on
capital projects. Data for local and state government are aggregated to produce
a series for sub-central government. This is necessary because for some coun-
tries there are only data for either local or state government but not both. In
addition, we took data on central government transfers to sub-central govern-
ment. Both spending and transfers data are converted into constant prices
using the GDP deflator series, which, together with the real GDP data that we
use, is taken from the OECD’s National Accounts database. All series are
expressed in local currency terms. The sample consists of data for 23 high-
income countries6 over the period 1995-2006. Our choice of sample was
restricted by the intergovernmental transfers series, which while available for
most of the high-income OECD countries (excluding notably Australia and
Japan) is published consistently only from 1995 onwards.7 To estimate the
error-correction model we use the System Generalised Methods of Moments
(SYS-GMM) dynamic panel estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998).
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results from the SYS-GMM estimation of the error-correction model are
shown in Table 1. In the lower panel, the long-run slope estimate for the log
of real GDP is positive throughout. In five cases it is above one, implying gov-
ernment spending rising at a faster rate than GDP, consistent with a strict
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it i t it 1 it 1 it 1 2 it 1 itg g y g y− − −Δ = α + λ +βΔ + δΔ + π + π + ε (1)
interpretation of Wagner’s Law.  Δyit has a statistically significant effect on  Δgit
in five cases, with a positively signed estimated coefficient.
One of the first observations is that there is a larger cyclicality coeffi-
cient for sub-central government expenditure than for central government
expenditure. Our estimates suggest that the β coefficient from (1) is 2.086 for
sub-central government spending, but only 0.486 for central government
spending. Moreover, in the central government equation  Δyit is not statistically
significant. The estimate for the sub-central government tier implies that a one
standard deviation increase in Δyit (0.018) is expected to raise Δgit by 0.038.
The finding of acyclical central government spending is consistent with the
findings of Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) and Talvi and Végh (2005) for the G78,
though making a strict comparison is difficult, since they use data on gener-
al government expenditure, which is the sum of both central and sub-central
spending. When  Δyit is statistically significant, the sub-central tier of govern-
ment produces four out of the five positive estimates, which are also greater
than one in magnitude. Procyclicality is only found for central government
capital spending.
The observation that central government expenditures are likely to be
more counter-cyclical than sub-central government expenditures is consistent
with predictions that are presented in Section Two of the paper. However, they
are also consistent with predictions presented by an established literature on
fiscal federalism. Oates (1972) argued that counter-cyclical responsibility for
management of the economy should be the prerogative of central government.
The fiscal federalism literature does not imply that sub-central government
spending should be procyclical (that coefficients should be positive or that
coefficients should exceed one). The rent-seeking analysis predicts that it will
be more procyclical than central government spending and that coefficients
are also likely to exceed one. The rent-seeking analysis also predicts the full
pattern of spending across capital and current accounts that are reported at
the end of section two of the paper, and in this context:
(i) Higher values of procyclicality in central government capital expendi-
ture than in central government current expenditure. The estimated coefficient
for Δyit is 5.082 for capital spending by central government but only 0.142 for
central government current spending. Moreover, Δyit is not statistically signif-
icant for current spending. The finding of a higher elasticity for capital spend-
ing is consistent with the earlier literature that uses total government spend-
ing. For 51 developing countries, Akitoby et al. (2006) find a mean cyclicality
coefficient for capital spending of 2.677, whereas the current spending coeffi-
cient is 0.537; whilst Lane (2003) finds a mean cyclicality coefficient from the
OECD of 0.840 for government investment and 0.17 for government con-
sumption. Again, however, these studies have tended to concentrate on total
government spending from all tiers.9
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(ii) Higher values of procyclicality in sub-central government expenditures
gross of intergovernmental transfers than net of intergovernmental transfers. For
spending minus transfers, the slope estimate for the growth in income is 
-1.296, but Δyit is not statistically significant, whereas for total sub-central gov-
ernment spending it is significant and the estimated coefficient has a magni-
tude of 2.086 and significant at the 5 per cent level. Confirmation of this find-
ing also comes from the δ estimate for transfers, which has a value of 3.766,
where again Δyit is statistically significant. This implies that a one standard
deviation increase in Δyit will raise the growth in transfer spending by 0.068.
(iii) A stronger procyclicality bias in central government capital expendi-
tures-relative to current expenditures than in sub-central government capital
expenditures-relative to current expenditures. The ratio of capital spending esti-
mates to current spending estimates for Δyit is 5.082:0.142 whereas for sub-
central government spending it is 2.836:1.460. Δyit is statistically significant
at the 10 per cent level in all cases except for current spending by central gov-
ernment. The result suggests that sub-central governments are more willing
to increase spending on both capital and current accounts as they are able to
finance increased spending with intergovernmental grants.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has focused on the pattern of cyclical expenditure across govern-
ment budgets. The literature that explains procyclical government spending
emphasises the importance of political pressures to increase public expendi-
ture in economic upturns. This paper has emphasised the relevance of politi-
cians' willingness to accommodate pressures to increase public expenditure.
Indulgent expenditure in economic upturns leaves governments without a
budget surplus sufficient to sustain expenditure in recessions.
The first conclusion in this paper is that there is evidence of a system-
atic pattern of procyclical expenditure across budgets in the OECD. The sec-
ond conclusion is that this pattern is consistent with the proposition that
politicians are more at ease increasing expenditures from some budgets than
from others. They are more at ease when an increase in expenditure is unlike-
ly to draw voters’ attention to the prospect of any increase in taxation. In an
economic upturn, politicians are more likely to accommodate pressures from
relatively ‘small’ groups because they are able to dissipate an increase in tax-
ation across a ‘large’ group of taxpayers.
When focussing on the pattern of cyclicality in the OECD, central gov-
ernment spending is acyclical, but sub-central government spending is
strongly procyclical. Central government capital expenditures are more pro-
cyclical than central government current account expenditures. This evidence
of capital spending is consistent with Lane's (2003, p.2668) prediction that
‘..the most procyclical component of government spending is government
investment…’ . Sub-central government spending gross of intergovernmental
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transfers is more procyclical than sub-central government transfers net of
intergovernmental transfers. Capital spending is procyclical for central and
sub-central governments, but only current government expenditure is pro-
cyclical for sub-central governments.10
While each comparison (e.g. that central government capital expenditure
is more procyclical than central government current expenditure) is relevant in its
own right, it is important to emphasise the consistency that exists when focussing
on the pattern of procyclical expenditures. It is important to note, for example, that
sub-central current expenditures are procyclical and central government current
expenditures are not. In both instances, consumer groups are difficult to mobilise
as pressure groups. But in the case of sub-central government expenditures,
politicians in sub-central governments are inclined to increase current expendi-
tures because they can dissipate tax costs across a ‘large’ group of taxpayers else-
where in the nation state. Systematic differences in willingness to indulge pres-
sures are relevant when predicting procyclical expenditure.
While pressures from ‘small’ groups are likely to be more intense than
pressures from 'large' groups, the evidence in this paper is consistent with the
proposition that politicians’ vote-maximising concerns are also relevant when
predicting procyclical expenditure. Their willingness to indulge pressures is
important when predicting the likelihood of procyclical expenditure. With
these results, there is reason to question the proposition that politicians are
solely motivated by their desire to maximise social welfare. Studies that
analyse the costs of rent seeking focus on static resource misallocation costs
(e.g. Mueller, 2003; Cullis and Jones, 2009). However there are also further
costs, downstream. Low-income individuals are particularly vulnerable in eco-
nomic recessions (e.g. Bordo and Meissner, 2011). Indulgence in an econom-
ic upturn makes it even more difficult to offer social protection in a recession.
The overarching conclusion is that expenditures are more likely to be
procyclical the more that vote-maximising politicians are inclined to indulge
political pressures when national income is increasing.
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ENDNOTES
1. (Abbott) Business School, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull, HU6 7RX, UK.
Corresponding author. Tel: +44 1482463570; fax: +44 1482463484. E-mail:
a.abbott@hull.ac.uk  (Jones) Department of Economics, University of Bath, Claverton
Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK The authors are grateful to the editor and two anonymous
referees for making helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2.  Alesina et al. (2008, p 1007) suggest that ‘...in bad times, many developing coun-
tries cannot borrow, or can do so only at very high interest rates, therefore they can-
not run deficits and have to cut spending; in booms, they can borrow more easily and
choose to do so, increasing public spending...’. If this is a reflection of failure in finan-
cial markets, governments might rely on procyclical expenditure to increase welfare.
Economic Issues, Vol. 19, Part 2, 2014
- 49 -
3.  In some countries, the same politicians that represent sub-central jurisdictions are
also the politicians that collectively signal ability to manage the economy. However,
with this mix of incentives, politicians will press for intergovernmental transfers vora-
ciously when national income increases, but be far more concerned about increasing
other central government expenditures when national income falls.
4. For further analysis of the constraints that limit sub-central government reliance on
borrowing, see Rodden (2002).
5. A similar structure was proposed by Akitoby et al. (2006).
6. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and United States.
7. For a few countries data are only published for a more limited interval (e.g. Greece;
Iceland).
8. Woo (2009) also reports a mean fiscal cyclicality coefficient of 0.176 for the OECD
countries, in contrast to a mean coefficient of 0.818 for a sample of developing coun-
tries.
9. In an attempt to further explain the procyclicality of our government expenditure
series, particularly to ascertain whether the nature of the political or electoral system
influences the degree of procyclicality, we interacted yit with i) an election dummy (to
account for the possibility of an electoral cycle for procyclicality); ii) with the intensity
of trade union membership (accounting for the influence on public sector employ-
ment/wages and hence government spending); iii) accounting for the proportion of total
government spending coming from the central government sector (and hence the
degree of federalisation across economies). Generally, we found these interaction terms
were not statistically significant. However, we did find for the cyclicality of intergov-
ernmental transfers, the interaction term with the election dummy was statistically sig-
nificant and the estimated coefficient positively signed. The estimation results are
available from the authors upon request.
10. In this paper the analysis began by focusing on capital expenditures. Lane (2003)
reported evidence that procyclical wage expenditures were sensitive to pressure to
increase spending in the OECD in an economic upturn. He used the Henisz (2000)
index as a proxy for ‘voracity effects’ (this index is based on the number of veto points
in the process of decision-making and the distribution of differences in preferences for
government spending). However, Lane's observation is also consistent with the hypoth-
esis presented here. Politicians are more disposed to indulge pressures (in economic
upturns) that are exerted by relatively 'small' groups (in this case, by public sector
trade unions).
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